The European Commission has updated the list of airlines banned in the European Union to impose an operating ban on one air carrier from Ghana and to place operating restrictions on another air carrier from that country.

This update is adopted following exceptional measures taken by two Member States which have banned the air carriers in question from their territory. With this update, the carrier Meridian Airways from Ghana is included in the list of banned airlines as a consequence of a series of very poor results from inspections involving not only their aircraft but also facilities used by the airline in the EU.

Another air carrier from Ghana, Airlift International, was inspected in a Member State and the results indicated a standard well below that required by international standards. The Air Safety Committee unanimously supported the introduction of operating restrictions on Airlift International to exclude from operations into the EU the inspected aircraft, plus two others that are currently in storage. This leaves the company with one aircraft that is still permitted to operate into the EU. The Commission will continue to monitor closely the performance of the airline and will intensify its consultations with the civil aviation organisation of Ghana to find sustainable solutions to the identified safety problems. The Commission will review the case of the two carriers at the next meeting of the Air Safety Committee in November.

The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) issued safety recommendations to Transport Canada as a result of their investigation into a serious incident involving a DHC-8 engine failure.

On March 25, 2009 a DHC-8-402, registered JA847C, operated by Japan Air Commuter as regularly scheduled Flight 3760, took off from Tanegashima Airport (TNE). While the aircraft was climbing an abnormal noise emanated from the No. 1 engine and instrument indications showed the occurrence of engine failure. The engine was then shut down and the aircraft requested emergency landing clearance from the Kagoshima Radar Approach Control Facility. The aircraft landed safely at Kagoshima Airport.

JTSB concluded that it is highly probable that, while the aircraft was climbing after takeoff, the RGB helical input gearshaft of the No. 1 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW150A engine sustained fatigue fracture and was detached from its position; the fragments of the broken shaft then flew off, damaging the engine case and breaking the blades of the HPT and the blades and vanes of the LPT and PT at the downstream stages, and this resulted in breakdown of the engine. With regard to the fatigue fracture of the RGB helical input gearshaft, it is considered probable that fatigue cracks had started from the impurity inclusion present in the metal stock of the helical gear developed in the shaft, and after undergoing repetitive application of stress, the shaft was finally fractured.
In view of this serious incident, the Japan Transport Safety Board recommends that Transport Canada give careful consideration to the following and take necessary measures thereof:

(1) Considering the detrimental effect on safety brought about by the inclusion of impurities in the RGB helical input gearshaft of the engine involved in this serious incident, P&WC, the manufacturer of the engine, should make company-wide efforts including the management of the metal stock supplier and component manufacturer serving P&WC, towards improved quality control concerning the production of the RGB helical input
gear shaft.

(2) P&WC assigned a hazard severity of “Significant – Level 3” to this serious incident by considering only the occurrence of an IFSD as the basis for the risk level determination, but the actual conditions included the loss of all functions of the feathering system for the propeller of the shutdown engine in addition to the engine in IFSD.
The risk assessment of this serious incident should not be made only on the engine necessitating an IFSD, but instead the incident must be reassessed from the viewpoint of the safety of the entire aircraft, and safety improvement actions should be taken if the results of the reassessment indicate this to be necessary.

The Aviation Safety Council (ASC) of Taiwan issued several safety recommendations as a result of their investigation into an  occurrence when an Airbus A330 made an emergency descent due to temporary interruption in the bleed air system supply.

On September 14, 2008 an Airbus A330-300, registered B-HLH, operated by Cathhay Pacific as regularly scheduled Flight CX521, took off from Tokyo-Narita Airport (NRT/RJAA), Japan on a flight to Hong Kong. Due to the presence of a typhoon the flight was rescheduled to Taipei-Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport (TPE/RCTP). There were 72 persons on board. The airplane was dispatched with the nr.1 engine bleed air system inoperative per MEL.

The aircraft encountered interruptions of the bleed air system supply at 38,544 ft during descent from flight level FL400. Flight crew members conducted an emergency descent and landed safely at Taipei international airport at approximately 19:29. The aircraft was not damaged and none of the 72 occupants were injured.

The investigators concluded:

Giving the de-activated status of the No.1 engine bleed air valve per MEL 36-11-02, the no.2 engine bleed air was the only one compressed air source for the two air conditioning systems.
The no.2 engine bleed air valve operated in a high demand status. During aircraft descent, the compressed air automatically bled from high pressure stage which provided the compressed air with higher pressure and higher temperature.
This led the pre-cooler downstream temperature air getting higher. Due to the THC’s grid filter contaminated from which to reduce the muscle air pressure to control fan air valve that resulted in the fan air valve could not open properly to provide sufficient cooling air to pre-cooler. The no.2 engine bleed air valve was shut down automatically due to bleed air overheat.
Both air conditioning systems lost the compressed air source and thereby aircraft lost its pressurization capability.

The Aviation Safety Council issued following 4 Safety Recommendations to Hong Kong CAD and Cathay Pacific Airways:

1. require Cathay Pacific Airways to consider evaluating or revising the MEL procedure to reduce the depressurization risk under one engine bleed air fail, and recover the cabin pressurization capability with APU in a timely manner when the second engine bleed air system also failed;
2. require Cathay Pacific Airways to consider evaluating the maintenance program for ThC shop-in service or overhaul interval before the new grid filter design or modification come to effect;
3. require Cathay Pacific Airways to consider evaluating the MEL restriction regarding aircraft been dispatched from home base with an inoperative system to lower the dual bleed system failure risk;
4. require Cathay Pacific Airways to review air dual bleed fault and emergency descent procedures and revise related inconsistent procedures accordingly; and require Cathay Pacific Airways cabin crew members to review cabin depressurization related procedures including: provide oxygen bottle side effect information, manually opening the oxygen cover panel to initiate oxygen flow; enhance cabin crew depressurization training.

Three safety recommendations were issued to the DGAC France to:

1. require manufacturer to modify or redesign the ThC grid filter to reduce the risk of A330 dual bleed system failure;
2. recommend the manufacturer to evaluate the maintenance program for ThC shop-in service or overhaul interval before the new design or modification come to effect and require manufacturer to review air dual bleed fault and emergency descent procedures and revise related inconsistent procedures accordingly; and
3. require manufacturer considering to take the in-service fleet events and family fleet problem solving experiences into Product Safety Process account and form the problem solving task force in an earlier time as proactive risk mitigation measure.

The Aviation Safety Council issued  recommendations to CAA Taiwan as follows:

1. require controller followed ATMP procedures;
2. enhance controller emergency response and situation awareness when handling the distress aircraft in accordance with the ATMP procedure;
3. enhance ATC internal coordination, communication during emergency situation includes the training, checking and handling of distress aircraft and carefully selected appropriate radio communication stations as backup system to avoid communication performance degrade; and
4. to revise the TACC Guard frequency radio test inclusive at SALMI waypoint and review and revise the ATMP Chinese version 2-4-15 word meaning in accordance with the English version 1-2-1.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a .2 million civil penalty against American Airlines Inc. for failing to correctly follow an Airworthiness Directive involving the maintenance of its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft. This civil penalty is the largest ever proposed by the FAA.

The FAA alleges American did not follow steps outlined in a 2006 Airworthiness Directive requiring operators to inspect wire bundles located in the wheel wells of MD-80 aircraft. The Airworthiness Directive, AD 2006-15-15, required a one-time general visual inspection by March 5, 2008 for chafing or signs of arcing of the wire bundle for the auxiliary hydraulic pump. It also required operators to perform corrective actions in accordance with the instructions of the applicable manufacturer’s Service Bulletin.

The purpose of the Airworthiness Directive was to prevent the shorting of wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in loss of auxiliary hydraulic power or a fire in the wheel well of the aircraft. The Airworthiness Directive also sought to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with the flammable vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion.

The FAA first detected the violations on March 25, 2008, during an inspection of two aircraft. The FAA informed American’s management that the aircraft did not comply with the AD, prompting a series of re-inspections and additional maintenance work that occurred during the following two weeks. On March 26, after American performed additional maintenance on its MD-80 fleet, the FAA inspected eight aircraft at American’s Tulsa maintenance base and found that seven did not comply with the Airworthiness Directive. On April 7, the FAA inspected another nine MD-80 aircraft at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and found that eight of them still did not comply with the AD.  A tenth aircraft inspected by American mechanics also did not comply. On April 8, American began grounding its MD-80 fleet to conduct new inspections and redo work as necessary.

The FAA subsequently determined that 286 of the airline’s MD-80s were operated on a combined 14,278 passenger flights while the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Regulations. American ultimately completed the work required by the 2006 Airworthiness Directive. Over the last year and a half, FAA safety officials have reported progress in working with American Airlines to help improve the airline’s maintenance culture. The FAA is committed to continuing that work.

American has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s civil penalty letter to respond to the agency.

The Dallas Morning News quotes an American statement on the issue: “These events happened more than two years ago, and we believe this action is unwarranted….We plan to follow the FAA’s process and will challenge any proposed civil penalty. We are confident we have a strong case and the facts will bear this out.”

The Danish National Audit Office published follow-up report on their 2006 safety oversight audit of the country’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), noting several improvements.

The office lauded the CAA for creating a supervisory planning system, improving the database which CAA uses as basis for inspection plans and inspection reports.

Also, the Ministry of Transport now receives information about the STK’s oversight activities.  Sandinavisk Tilsynskontor (STK) is a joint inspection office between the three Scandinavian civil aviation authorities.

Yet, the offices notes that SAS Scandinavian Airlines still carried out “irregular flights”, flights that were carried out without performing inspections required by 20 different airworthiness directives (ADs).

According to the Danish CAA SAS performed 11,114 irregular flight during the 2006-2009 period: 2331 in 2006, 2788 in 2007, 3714 in 2008 and 2281 in 2009. This number should be significantly reduced after completion of the anticipated reorganization of supervision by mid 2010.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that Mexico is not in compliance with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), following an assessment of the country’s civil aviation authority. As a result, the United States is downgrading Mexico from a Category 1 to Category 2 rating.

As part of the FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to fly to the United States and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations. With the IASA Category 2 rating, Mexican air carriers cannot establish new service to the United States, although they are allowed to maintain existing service.

While Mexico has been responsive to the FAA’s findings and has made significant improvements in recent months, it was unable to fully comply with all of the international safety standards.  However, under the leadership of Director General Hector Gonzalez Weeks, Mexico continues to make progress. The FAA is committed to working closely with the Mexican government and providing technical assistance to help Mexico regain its Category 1 rating.

A Category 1 rating means the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards.  A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping or inspection procedures.

Countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is proposing a civil penalty of 0,000 against Continental Airlines for allegedly operating a Boeing 767 on 22 revenue flights when it was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA alleges that on Aug. 12, 2008, Continental replaced the nose landing gear wheel and tire assembly on a B-767, but failed to install the required axle washer despite warnings in the maintenance manual and on the tire assembly itself. The warning said failing to install the washer could lead to failure of the wheel bearing.

FAA inspectors discovered the violation during a records check and noted three identical earlier violations.

Continental has 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letter to respond to the agency.

The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has suspended the air operator’s certificates of Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services. These two charter operators, which share the same ownership, are based at Sydney’s Bankstown airport.

CASA believes allowing Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services to continue to operate while CASA completes further safety investigations poses a serious and imminent risk to air safety.

There have been three serious accidents and a number of incidents involving Skymaster aircraft in the last three months. On 15 June 2010 an aircraft operated by Skymaster crashed at Canley Vale in Sydney, with the pilot and a flight nurse killed. Other accidents include a wheels-up landing and a collapsed nose gear on landing. Incidents include a loss of engine power, fuel flow problems and landing gear malfunctions.

CASA’s decision to suspend Skymaster Air Services and Avtex Air Services is also based on issues relating to the safety culture of the operations, aircraft maintenance control and pilot training.

The suspension of Skymaster and Avtex will end in five business days from Friday 23 July 2010, unless CASA applies to the Federal Court for an order to continue the suspension for up to 40 days. During that time CASA will complete its investigation and determine what further action may need to be taken.

CASA’s actions are separate from the continuing investigation into the Canley Vale accident by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the independent Commonwealth transport accident investigator.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to assess a  civil penalties of ,000 against Spirit Airlins for alleged violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA alleges that Spirit Airlines returned an aircraft to service, and then operated that aircraft on revenue passenger flights when it was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations. The FAA alleged that Spirit failed to replace a faulty elevator aileron computer (ELAC) after the aircraft experienced an uncommanded pitch down of the nose while operating between Orlando, Fla. and San Juan, Puerto Rico on Aug. 21, 2009. Although Spirit’s maintenance program required replacement of the ELAC computer, the airline did not do so before flying the A321 on a revenue passenger flight the next day from San Juan to Fort Lauderdale, when the aircraft experienced another uncommanded pitch down.

The European Commission has updated the list of airlines banned in the European Union to include one carrier from Surinam and to expand the operating restrictions on Iran Air. In addition, two carriers from Indonesia have been removed from the list of banned airlines.

With this fourteenth update, the carrier Blue Wing Airlines from Surinam is included in the list of banned airlines following measures taken by a Member State as a consequence of a series of accidents suffered by this airline and serious deficiencies revealed during ramp inspections of its aircraft.

Based on the results of the visit to Iran, led by the Commission with the participation of experts from Member States and EASA to verify implementation by Iran Air of measures announced at the last Air Safety Committee in March 2010 by the civil aviation organisation of Iran and the air carrier, the Air Safety Committee unanimously supported the expansion of the operating restrictions imposed on Iran Air to exclude from operations into the EU its fleet of Airbus A-320 and of Boeing B-727 and B-747. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the performance of the airline through the results of ramp checks of its aircraft which can operate in the EU and will intensify its consultations with the civil aviation organisation of Iran to find sustainable solutions to the identified safety problems, where practicable through technical assistance.

With this update the Commission has also recognised the improvements in the oversight exercised by the competent authorities of Indonesia. These improvements allowed the Air Safety Committee to support the removal from the list of two Indonesian air carriers: Metro Batavia and Indonesia Air Asia.

In the same vein, the Commission welcomes the progress made by the civil aviation authority of Gabon in the implementation of the corrective action plan aimed at resolving the deficiencies identified by ICAO, and decided to allow air carrier Afrijet – which is permitted to operate under restrictions in the EU – to add another aircraft to its fleet used for such services.

In the framework of this update, the civil aviation authority of Albania is urged to intensify its oversight in relation to all carriers and continue to implement the action plan agreed with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), to give priority to those areas which raise safety concerns and to speed up its technical and administrative capacity building.

Today, the Community list has four carriers whose operations are fully banned in the European Union: Ariana Afghan Airlines from Afghanistan, Blue Wing Airlines from Surinam, Siem reap Airways International from Cambodia and Silverback Cargo Freighters from Rwanda. All carriers from 17 countries – 278 companies in total – are banned: Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon (with the exception of three carriers which operate under restrictions and conditions), Indonesia (with the exception of six carriers from which the restrictions have been fully removed), Kazakhstan (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia. There are 9 air carriers allowed to operate under restrictions and conditions: Air Koryo from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, TAAG Angola Airlines, Air Astana from Kazakhstan, Iran Air from Iran, Gabon Airlines, Afrijet and SN2AG from Gabon, Air Service Comores and Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines from Ukraine.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing ,476,075 in civil penalties against Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines of Bridgeton, Mo., for violation of various maintenance procedures and operating nine jets on 320 revenue passenger flights when the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines are both owned and operated by Trans States Holdings. Trans States Airlines performs maintenance and training on GoJet aircraft.

The proposed civil penalties involve seven GoJet+ Canadair Regional Jets and two Trans States Embraer 145 regional jets. The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet operated aircraft when maintenance had been carried out incorrectly, and that the company failed to complete required maintenance record-keeping.

The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet violated a number of maintenance regulations and procedures, including use of outdated manufacturers’ maintenance instructions to perform repairs; failure to connect a wing flap actuator to its torque tube, rendering the flaps inoperative; failure to document an inspection after an aircraft was damaged by severe turbulence; failure to document and carry out proper repairs after aircraft warning systems identified problems; improper repair of an engine oil leak and failure to comply with minimum equipment list regulations.

Trans States and GoJet have 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letters to respond to the agency.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes to amend the airworthiness standards applicable to certain transport category airplanes certified for flight in icing conditions and the icing airworthiness standards applicable to certain aircraft engines.

The proposed regulations would improve safety by addressing supercooled large drop icing conditions for transport category airplanes most affected by these icing conditions, mixed phase and ice crystal conditions for all transport category airplanes, and supercooled large drop, mixed phase, and ice crystal icing conditions for all turbine engines. These proposed regulations are the result of information gathered from a review of icing accidents and incidents.

ATSB pilot information card to help flight crew identify factors that could increase the risk of a misaligned take-off or landing.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) published a study into factors influencing misaligned take-off occurrences at night. This report examines both Australian as well as relevant international occurrences
where pilots have misperceived their lateral position on runway due to darkness and a combination of individual influences, runway, weather and task conditions.

The study was iniated following several occurrences that involved aircraft commencing takeoff on the runway edge lighting. All five recent Australian misaligned take-off and landing occurrences involved aircraft with weights greater than 5,700kg and three of the six occurrences involved scheduled regular passenger transport operations. The remaining two occurrences involved charter operations.

After reviewing the Australian and international occurrences, eight common factors were identified that increased the risk of a misaligned take-off or landing occurrence. The factors included:

• distraction or divided attention of the flight crew;
• confusing runway layout; displaced threshold or intersection departure;
• poor visibility or weather; air traffic control clearance/s issued during runway entry;
• no runway centreline lighting;
• flight crew fatigue; and
• recessed runway edge lighting

To foster safety awareness, knowledge and action, the ATSB developed a pilot information card to help flight crew identify factors that could increase the risk of a misaligned take-off or landing.

A new report released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) highlights ways to manage the risks posed by aircraft hitting birds and reveals that the reported number of  birdstrikes in Australia has steadily increased over the past eight years.

The report, which provides aviation birdstrike and animal strike occurrence data between January 2002 and December 2009, shows that in 2009 alone there were 1,340 birdstrikes reported to the ATSB.

The increase in the number of birdstrikes, however, is consistent with the increase in the number of high capacity aircraft movements over the period as well as a greater willingness of people in aviation to report safety occurrences to the ATSB.

Most birdstrikes occur within the confines of aerodromes (less than 5 km). Major and regional towered aerodromes had significantly higher rates of reported birdstrikes than General Aviation Airport Procedures (GAAP) aerodromes, and had considerably increasing rates from 2002 to 2009. GAAP aerodrome birdstrike rates do not appear to have changed.

Engine ingestion makes up 11 per cent of all birdstrike occurrences in high capacity air transport for the 8- year period, and the highest number of damaging birdstrikes occurs in high capacity air transport. Birdstrikes causing multiple parts damaged were not common throughout the period. General aviation had the highest proportion of damaging birdstrikes, with almost 24 per cent of birdstrikes causing damage. Aeroplane wings and helicopter rotor blades are the most commonly damaged aircraft components across all operational types, particularly in general aviation. There have been eight occurrences from the period of 2002-2009 that have resulted in serious aircraft damage, and four that have resulted in injury.

The most common types of birds struck by aircraft were lapwings/plovers, bats/flying foxes, galahs, and kites. Not surprisingly, larger birds were more likely to result in aircraft damage.

Animal strikes were relatively rare. High capacity air transport had the highest average with 11.5 animal strikes per year, with general aviation having the second highest average with 9.3 animal strikes per year. The most common animals involved in strikes were hares/rabbits, kangaroos, wallabies, and foxes/dogs. Damaging strikes mostly involved kangaroos, wallabies and livestock.

Bird hazard control at aerodromes was found to be mostly related to the control of grass height (short or long) and growing specific plants or grass, and the daily or weekly use or auditory deterrents, especially car horns and shotguns.